Blue Carbon Policy: NDCs, Article 6 and the Global Framework
How blue carbon fits into the Paris Agreement — NDCs, Article 6 trading, national inventories and coastal-wetland accounting — and where kelp stands.
Priya Raman ·
If two parties claim the same tonne of carbon, the atmosphere loses. Here is what double counting is, why Article 6 exists, and what buyers should check.
Here is a small parable. A coastal nation restores a mangrove and the project sells 10,000 carbon credits to an overseas airline, which uses them to neutralise flights. Meanwhile, the mangrove's carbon absorption also shows up in the host nation's own greenhouse-gas inventory, counted toward its national climate target. One tonne of real atmospheric benefit has now been claimed twice: once by the airline, once by the nation. On paper, the world's ledgers show two tonnes of progress. The atmosphere, which keeps the only ledger that matters, registers one.
That is double counting, and it is the quiet integrity risk at the heart of international carbon markets. It is not fraud in the cartoonish sense — often nobody lies — it is an accounting collision between two parties who each, quite reasonably, consider the reduction theirs. Solving it is what much of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is actually about. This article explains the mechanics in plain language and gives buyers the practical checks to run before purchasing any credit, including the blue carbon credits at the heart of Tidewright's work.
The crudest version: two credits issued for the same tonne. This happens when a project is registered in more than one registry, or when registry controls are weak. Modern registries make this harder through serial numbers, project deduplication checks and, increasingly, data-sharing agreements between registries. It should be rare — and mostly is — but it was not rare enough in the early voluntary market's wilder years.
One credit, used twice. A credit is "retired" by a company to claim the offset, but then resold, or claimed again, or used to satisfy both a voluntary pledge and a compliance obligation. Registries prevent this with retirement: cancellation of the serial number on first use, permanently. If a credit is not retired in a public registry with your name on the retirement record, you have purchased an invoice, not an outcome.
The parable above, and the most important flavour today: two different parties claim the same underlying reduction for their own targets — typically a project developer's buyer on one side and a host country's Paris target (its Nationally Determined Contribution, or NDC) on the other. Unlike double issuance and double use, good registries alone cannot stop this, because the second claim happens inside a national inventory the registry never sees. Fixing it requires governments.
A softer cousin: one credit satisfying multiple different claim types simultaneously — say, counted toward an airline's carbon-neutral product, an investor's financed-emissions target and a seller's own net-zero plan. Clear rules about who may claim what, when, are the fix; sloppy contractual language is the risk.
The Paris Agreement changed everything by giving every country a climate target. Under the old Kyoto architecture, only some countries had binding caps, so a credit sold out of an uncapped country did not collide with a host-country claim — the host had no target to claim against. Now every tonne reduced anywhere on Earth helps some country's NDC, because national inventories are how NDCs are tracked. Sell that tonne to a foreign buyer who also counts it, and you have structural double claiming built into the system.
Article 6 provides the plumbing to prevent it, chiefly through the corresponding adjustment. When a host country authorises a reduction for transfer to a buyer — whether another government or, through authorisation, a private purchaser — it adds that amount back into its own emissions accounting. In effect the host says: we no longer count this tonne toward our target; the buyer may count it instead. The atmosphere sees one claim, the books reconcile, and the host country must then work harder to meet its NDC — which is why authorisation is a real decision with real domestic cost, not a rubber stamp.
Our overview of blue carbon policy and Article 6 covers the treaty architecture in more depth; the short version is that Article 6.2 enables government-to-government and authorised transfers, while Article 6.4 creates a new UN-supervised crediting mechanism intended to succeed the Kyoto-era Clean Development Mechanism.
Most corporate buyers are not governments, and the voluntary market straddles an uncomfortable line. A voluntary carbon credit from a project in a host country may or may not carry a corresponding adjustment — and whether that matters for your claim is one of the market's liveliest live debates:
The practical takeaway is not to panic-buy only adjusted credits — supply is thin — but to match the credit to the claim. Funding coastal restoration as a climate contribution is defensible with high-quality unadjusted credits; promising customers that a flight or product is carbon-neutral increasingly is not.
Coastal carbon projects make double-counting questions unusually concrete, because the carbon sits inside ecosystems that governments are also counting on for fisheries, coastal protection and tourism. Three situations recur:
Tidewright's position, as a fictional demonstration company, follows what we would ask of any credible operator: every credit issued through our Canopy Ledger is tied to a public registry retirement, our methodology page states plainly that all figures are illustrative, and we treat host-country authorisation status as part of the basic disclosure a serious buyer deserves.
These sit alongside the wider due-diligence questions in our blue carbon buyer's guide and the project-quality criteria in nature-based solutions integrity.
Usually not — it is more often an accounting gap than a crime. But it undermines the environmental integrity of every claim involved, which is why Article 6, registry rules and buyer standards exist to close the gaps.
When a country authorises a carbon reduction for transfer abroad, it adds the amount back to its own emissions tally so the tonne is counted only once globally — by the buyer, not the host.
It depends on the claim. For a pure contribution claim, most practitioners say no; for any claim that a credit neutralises emissions against an NDC-covered sector, the market is moving toward yes. When in doubt, ask for the adjustment status and word your claim accordingly.
Retirement records are public on the major registries. A properly retired credit has a serial number, a retirement date and a named beneficiary; if a seller cannot produce that record for your specific purchase, walk away.
The registry-level risks (issuance, use) apply to all credits. NDC double claiming is less acute for kelp today because few national inventories count macroalgal carbon yet — but as inventory science advances, that will change, and forward-looking projects should design for it now.
How blue carbon fits into the Paris Agreement — NDCs, Article 6 trading, national inventories and coastal-wetland accounting — and where kelp stands.
Priya Raman ·
MRV — monitoring, reporting, verification — is the machinery that makes blue carbon credits real. How coastal carbon claims get measured and audited.
Priya Raman ·

Blue carbon credits can fund real coastal restoration — or expensive stories. A practical due-diligence checklist for corporate buyers before they sign.
Priya Raman ·